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NOT PRECEDENTIAL 
 
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
  ____________ 
 
No. 10-3647 
____________ 
 
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 
 
v. 
 
RADCLIFFE BENT, 
 
                                    Appellant 
____________ 
 
On Appeal from the United States District Court 
for the District of New Jersey 
(D.C. No. 08-cr-00794) 
District Judge:  Honorable Dennis M. Cavanaugh 
____________ 
 
Submitted Under Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a) 
September 20, 2011 
 
Before:  FISHER, HARDIMAN and GREENAWAY, JR., Circuit Judges. 
 
(Filed: September 21, 2011) 
____________ 
 
OPINION OF THE COURT 
____________ 
 
HARDIMAN, Circuit Judge. 
 Radcliffe Bent appeals his judgment of sentence after pleading guilty to conspiracy 
to commit mail and wire fraud, conspiracy to commit money laundering, and tax evasion. 
Following his counsel’s motion to withdraw pursuant to Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 
 
2 
 
738 (1967), Bent filed a pro se brief, arguing: (1) his guilty plea was not knowing and 
voluntary; and (2) the District Court erred in adopting the loss calculation in his 
Presentence Investigation Report (PSR).  For the reasons that follow, we will grant 
counsel’s motion to withdraw and affirm the District Court’s judgment. 
I 
 Because we write for the parties, we recite only the facts and procedural history 
necessary for our decision. 
 From 2001 to 2007, Bent and several coconspirators defrauded approximately 
twenty-nine investors.  Their scheme consisted of inducing these investors to purchase 
shares of stock and promissory notes in corporations they controlled by promising 
exorbitant returns.  Bent and his coconspirators then diverted the investors’ funds—
approximately $13.6 million in total—for personal gain. 
In May 2009, Bent pleaded guilty to one count of Conspiracy to Commit Mail and 
Wire Fraud, contrary to 18 U.S.C. §§ 1341 and 1343, and in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1349 
(Count One), one count of Conspiracy to Commit Money Laundering, contrary to 18 
U.S.C. § 1957(a) and in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1956(h) (Count Five), and one count of 
Tax Evasion, in violation of 26 U.S.C. § 7201 (Count Nine).  The Probation Office 
prepared a PSR, which calculated Bent’s total offense level to be 36 and his criminal 
history category to be II, yielding a Guidelines range of 210 to 262 months imprisonment. 
 Bent and the Government objected to two upward adjustments applied in the PSR and 
 
3 
 
the District Court sustained both objections, reducing his Guidelines range to 108 to 135 
months imprisonment.  The District Court imposed a sentence of 110 months 
imprisonment on Count One, 100 months imprisonment on Count Five and 60 months 
imprisonment on Count Nine, all of which were to be served concurrently.  The District 
Court also ordered Bent to pay restitution in the amount of $7,399,396.57. 
Bent filed a timely notice of appeal.  His counsel now seeks to withdraw under 
Anders, asserting there are no nonfrivolous issues for appeal.  The Government has filed a 
brief supporting counsel’s Anders motion and Bent has filed a pro se brief in opposition 
to his counsel’s motion.1
                                                 
 1 The District Court had jurisdiction pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3231.  We have 
jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291. 
 
II 
 When counsel seeks to withdraw pursuant to Anders, we must: (1) determine 
whether counsel has adequately fulfilled the requirements of Third Circuit Local 
Appellate Rule 109.2 by thoroughly searching the record for appealable issues and 
explaining why those issues are frivolous; and (2) conduct an independent review of the 
record to see if there are any nonfrivolous issues for appeal.  United States v. Coleman, 
575 F.3d 316, 319 (3d Cir. 2009). 
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A 
To satisfy the first prong of our inquiry, counsel must examine the record, 
conclude that there are no nonfrivolous issues for review, and request permission to 
withdraw.  United States v. Youla, 241 F.3d 296, 300 (3d Cir. 2001).  Counsel must 
accompany a motion to withdraw with a “brief referring to anything in the record that 
might arguably support the appeal.”  Anders, 386 U.S. at 744.  Counsel need not raise and 
reject every possible claim, but must, at a minimum, meet the “conscientious 
examination” standard set forth in Anders.  Youla, 241 F.3d at 300. 
 In his Anders brief, Bent’s counsel identifies three potential issues for appeal and 
explains why each is frivolous.  Counsel maintains that: (1) the District Court had 
jurisdiction to sentence Bent under 18 U.S.C. § 3231; (2) Bent’s guilty plea was knowing 
and voluntary and complied with the mandates of Rule 11 of the Federal Rules of 
Criminal Procedure; and (3) the sentence imposed by the District Court was procedurally 
and substantively reasonable.  Counsel’s brief satisfies prong one of our inquiry by 
evidencing an adequate examination of the record by counsel and explaining his 
conclusion that there are no nonfrivolous issues for appeal. 
B 
“Where the Anders brief initially appears adequate on its face, the proper course is 
for the appellate court to be guided in reviewing the record by the Anders brief itself,” as 
well as any issues raised in a defendant’s pro se brief.  Youla, 241 F.3d at 301 (internal 
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quotation omitted). 
 In his pro se brief, Bent argues: (1) his plea was not knowing and voluntary 
because he was under the influence of drugs at the time of the Rule 11 colloquy; and (2) 
the District Court erroneously calculated his Guidelines range by overstating the actual 
loss attributable to him.  We find each of these arguments to be without merit. 
1 
 First, Bent argues that his plea was not knowing and voluntary because he was 
under the influence of various bipolar medications when the District Court conducted its 
plea colloquy.  Bent asserts that his attorney knew that Bent was undergoing ongoing 
treatment for bipolar disorder and that his plea proceedings had been continued on two 
prior occasions due to the impact of his medication.  Bent further asserts that the District 
Court was made aware, by a pretrial report, that he was being treated with psychiatric 
medications and that the Court should have conducted an independent inquiry to 
determine whether this rendered his plea involuntary. 
Because Bent did not object to the District Court’s decision to accept his plea, we 
review the Court’s decision for plain error.  Under the plain error standard, Bent bears the 
burden of showing that there is “‘(1) [an] error, (2) that is plain, and (3) that affect[s] 
substantial rights.’”  United States v. Vazquez, 271 F.3d 93, 99 (3d Cir. 2001) (quoting 
Johnson v. United States, 520 U.S. 461, 467 (1997)).  “If all three conditions are met, 
[we] may then exercise [our] discretion to notice a forfeited error, but only if (4) the error 
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seriously affect[s] the fairness, integrity, or public reputation of judicial proceedings.”  Id. 
(quoting Johnson, 520 U.S. at 467). 
Our review of the record reveals Bent’s argument to be meritless.  During its plea 
colloquy, the District Court specifically asked Bent whether he was “under the influence 
of either alcohol or drugs,” to which he responded: “I am not.”  The District Court 
proceeded to ask Bent a series of questions about his decision to plead guilty, which 
revealed that he was lucid and actively engaged in the plea proceeding.  Prior to finding 
Bent competent to enter a plea, the District Court asked his counsel whether he was 
“satisfied that th[e] Plea [was] being entered voluntarily and [was] entered by the 
Defendant with full knowledge of all of his rights and responsibilities,” to which Counsel 
responded: “I am.”  Cf. United States v. Jones, 336 F.3d 245, 256 (3d Cir. 2003) 
(explaining that an attorney’s affirmative representation about her client’s competency 
may be considered by a district court).2
 Second, Bent argues that the District Court erred in adopting the PSR’s loss 
  Based on the foregoing, we are satisfied that 
Bent’s plea was knowing and voluntary. 
2 
                                                 
2  To the extent Bent is arguing that his trial counsel was ineffective for failing to 
inform the District Court that Bent had taken medication prior to the plea proceeding, we 
decline to review this issue on direct appeal.  See United States v. Thornton, 327 F.3d 
268, 271 (3d Cir. 2003) (“It has long been the practice of this court to defer the issue of 
ineffectiveness of trial counsel to a collateral attack.” (citing United States v. Haywood, 
155 F.3d 674, 678 (3d Cir. 1998))). 
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calculation of $7,399,397.  He claims that only $1,691,198 of the total loss was 
attributable to him because he was not involved in every transaction that comprised the 
conspiracy.  If Bent is correct regarding the loss calculation, the District Court overstated 
his total offense level in calculating his Guidelines range. 
Because Bent did not object to the District Court’s loss calculation at sentencing, 
we review that determination for plain error.  Vazquez, 271 F.3d at 99.  The gravamen of 
Bent’s objection to the District Court’s loss calculation appears to be that he was not 
personally responsible for some of the losses attributed to him.  This argument fails to 
recognize the fundamental point that because Bent was part of a conspiracy, he is 
responsible not only for the losses caused by his personal conduct, but also for the losses 
caused by “all reasonably foreseeable acts and omissions of others in furtherance of the 
jointly undertaken criminal activity.”  USSG § 1B1.3(a)(B).  Moreover, the Guidelines 
specifically provide that the District Court’s loss calculation shall include any “pecuniary 
harm that the defendant knew or, under the circumstances, reasonably should have 
known, was a potential result of the offense.”  USSG § 2B1.1 app. n.(3)(A)(iv).  
Therefore, the District Court did not plainly err in including losses not directly 
attributable to Bent in its calculation of loss. 
3 
Pursuant to the second prong of Anders, we have conducted an independent review 
of the record and find that there are no appealable issues of merit. 
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III 
 For the foregoing reasons, we will affirm the judgment of the District Court and, in 
a separate order, grant counsel’s motion to withdraw pursuant to Anders. 
